The Bigger the Better? Understanding the Biglaw Salary Scale

/ Law Firms, Law Job News / / By

You have no doubt heard the term Biglaw, but may not be able to place your finger on an exact definition. You are not alone in that.

Biglaw is an industry-specific nickname for high-revenue law firms with large headcounts. It can also refer to smaller firms that pay their lawyers a market rate salary, or even a medium-sized outfit with wide, international reach and notoriety.

All of these types of firms are typically headquartered in major US cities, like Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago, with multiple branches in smaller markets.

And, most notably, lawyers who work in Biglaw can expect to be paid based on the Cravath scale. 

The Cravath Scale

The Cravath Scale, an offshoot of the Cravath system, is named after Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, the firm which is generally considered the authority on setting associate salaries. Its compensatory functions include factors like the number of years out of law school and particular law school classes, among others.

Lawyers on this pay scale not only earn the same salary but can also anticipate receiving the same annual market bonus. Based on the lockstep and closely monitored structure of the scale, if one firm offers an associate a higher salary, other firms tend to follow suit. But while this scale is based on a platform of consistency, changes have been experienced throughout the years. 

To get a better understanding of how the Biglaw salary scale operates on a year-to-year basis, consider some examples of the history of trends certain law associates have experienced.

First Year Candidates

Needless to say, when fresh out of law school, successful first-year candidates have much to prove to the firms that take them on: long hours, dedicated work, limited time-off. But over the years, the take-home pay figures these associates earn may surprise you.

In 2006, about a year before the Great Recession, first-year associates in Biglaw firms earned an average salary of $145,000––with an additional $35,000 in bonuses, for a total of $180,000 (adjusted for inflation, this number is roughly $227,780).

. . in post-recession America, first-year associates earned about $5,000 less in 2009 than what the same grade of lawyers would earn ten years later.

Joshua Holt

By comparison, a first-year associate in 2019 earned $190,000 in salary and a further $15,000 in bonuses, for a total of $205,000. This would indicate that bonuses were higher pre-recession and have since decreased despite an increase in salary.

Compare these factors to the year at the end of the Great Recession. In 2009, first-year lawyers were paid, on average, $160,000 base salary, plus $7,500 in annual bonuses––for a total of $167,500. That same number, adjusted for inflation, is roughly $199,136. Therefore, in post-recession America, first-year associates earned about $5,000 less in 2009 than what the same grade of lawyers would earn ten years later. Additionally, a first-year lawyer in 2006 earned roughly $22,000 more than a first-year lawyer in 2019. 

Mid-Tier Associates

Let’s take a look at another tier. Using the same dates, consider the salaries of mid-level associates. In 2006 (remember: a pre-recession year), a fifth-year lawyer working at a Biglaw firm earned a $200,000 salary and an additional $55,000 in bonuses for a total of $255,000. When adjusted for inflation, that figure is about $322,689.

Again, by comparison, a fifth-year associate in 2019 received a base salary of $280,000, this time with an additional $80,000 in bonuses, for a total of $360,000. Once we revisit a post-recession America, the numbers continue to demonstrate a shift. In 2009, fifth-year lawyers earned $230,000 in salary, with $25,000 in annual bonuses, for a total of $255,000. Adjusted for inflation: $303,162.

The Senior Associate

To fully grasp the impact of the salary scale, there is one last tier to consider: the senior associate. In 2007, lawyers in their eighth year of practice with Biglaw firms, took home $280,000 in salary and $110,000 in bonuses, totaling $390,000 (or $480,292 when adjusted for inflation). Two years later, the salary is the same (at $280,000) and the bonuses make a sharp drop down to $30,000 (for a total of $310,000––$368,550 with inflation).

By 2019, eighth-year lawyers are up to $345,000 in salary, plus around $100,000 in bonuses, for a total annual take-home pay of $445,000. 

As you’ll notice, one consistent trend throughout the nearly fifteen-year timeframe is the significant decrease in bonus amounts for lawyers at all class levels during the recession years, followed by a sizable return to larger numbers in most recent years. 

The Top Tier Firms

So, while there appear to be fluctuations within the Biglaw pay scale, there benefits to joining a top-tier firm are still numerous. Although salaries and bonuses garner most of the spotlight, Biglaw associates receive additional perks, including free meals for working late, as well as reimbursement for travel, entertaining clients and the all-important bar expenses. 

Now that you have a better understanding of Biglaw––the pluses, the negatives, the inevitable economic impact(s)––would you still consider it worth the grade? 

Author Bio

Joshua Holt is the publisher of BigLawInvestor and an associate at Goodwin Procter LLP. He may be contacted through LinkedIn and on Twitter.

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The Barrister Shining a Legal Light on The Government’s Lockdown – Are We Now Living in a Police State?

/ Law Firms, Lawyers, New Zealand Law News, NZ Featured Posts / April 15, 2020 / By
Warrenpyke lawfuel

Barrister Warren Pyke has pointed out some important issues with the current Lockdown and the wide-ranging lockdown ‘laws’ that mimic the anti-picnic nonsense that has been seen in the UK.

Arguing that an approach more similar to Australia, permitting some ongoing business activity and acknowledging that any attempt to eliminate a disease that is here for ever will be doomed to failure, particularly when the experience of other such pandemics is that there will be ‘waves’ that continue, as indeed is already being experienced in places like Singapore and Wuhan, where the wet market-derived pandemic first arose.

A frequent adviser to the Law Society on disciplinary and other matters, Warren Pyke (pictured above) has expressed some grave doubts regarding the current lockdown – including the recent powers passed by an empty parliament.

He has written previously for the ADLS newsletter expressing reservations over the scope and legality of the lockdown prior to the enhanced legal powers recently provided to the now familiar face of Dr Ashley Bloomfield, Medical Director of Health.

Police Powers

The Health Act 1956 provides powers to medical functionaries, including the current Medical Director of Health, Dr Ashley Bloomfield, that is enforceable with the full force of the law. The Police can arrest and even imprison offenders.

Pyke commented on LinkedIn that we cannot definitively correlate the rate of occurrence of the disease to the measures so far taken, “despite how comforting this may be.”

“Which also suggests we may need to consider a long term economically sustainable set of less restrictive measures, including more testing.”

I argue that some quarantine regime is justified, just not this one. I will put forward points which are tied to the legal validity of the orders. There are no doubt contrary arguments or scientific conjectures (based on modelling or otherwise), some of which I have tried to address.

Warren Pyke

. ;the 3 April order is contrary to parliamentary sovereignty and democracy alike, particularly as it has been issued while Parliament was adjourned

Warren Pyke

He noted that “. . the 3 April order is contrary to parliamentary sovereignty and democracy alike, particularly as it has been issued while Parliament was adjourned (therefore it is beyond parliament’s immediate oversight – the mere activity of a special oversight committee is not enough to answer this point).”

“I argue that some quarantine regime is justified, just not this one. I will put forward points which are tied to the legal validity of the orders. There are no doubt contrary arguments or scientific conjectures (based on modelling or otherwise), some of which I have tried to address.

“If this offends those who think science or doctors are to be deified, so be it. My focus is on the law. I have recited some legal provisions and points that would not favour an argument advanced by an advocate, and I have done so consciously. I consider the effects of the health orders to be an issue of public importance, which needs to be aired.

“Section 70 of the Health Act was amended when the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 was passed. Parliament can therefore be taken to have considered and adjusted the scope of the powers under s 70 of the Health Act, to conform to the design of the later Act.

“It is doubtful that s 70(1)(f) authorises the director-general to make an order quarantining the whole population of the country. Section 70(1)(f) must be read together with its surrounding provisions and in the context of the Act as a whole, along with the triggering event which was the issuing of an epidemic notice. “

The Pyke article continues later . .

“Part 3A focusses on individuals in relation to the control of infectious diseases, of which COVID-19 is one.

“Looking first at the text of s 70(1)(f), the last four words do not enact an unfettered discretion. What the medical officer “thinks fit” is controlled by the preceding words, including the surrounding text. Directions under section 70 must be purposed to prevent the “spread of any infectious disease”: there must be some empirical foundation for such a wide-reaching measure. So little testing of the population has been done so far that it cannot be empirically established that widespread public infection presently exists.

“That “persons” is a reference to identifiable infected or possibly infected persons is indicated by attending to another word in section 70(1)(f) – ie, that is not included in the wording of the 3 April order: namely, that persons may be required to be “disinfected”.

“It would be arbitrary if a medical officer required a whole population to be disinfected, without regard to empirical facts, or individual medical conditions or circumstances. The 3 April quarantine order is similarly arbitrary. For example, it means that elderly or infirm people are often unable to access essential services (the people that concerned the Hon. Gerry Brownlee when he made his statement in the House), and that uninfected and low risk people’s lives and businesses are being damaged if not wrecked by such a draconian restriction.”

The powers granted to Dr Bloomfield since the article was published place enormous powers in the hands of the Medical director of Health. Controlling the virus may be one thing, but creating a fatally stabbed economy is another.

Bob Jones on Why The Lockdown Will Lose Labour the Next Election

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